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I. INTRODUCTION: DIVERSION AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
The concept of pretrial intervention (or its synonym, pretrial di-
version) was initially discussed as a rehabilitative strategy of potential
value to the criminal justice system in 1967 by the Presidential Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.' In 1970,
the President's Task Force on Prisoner Rehabilitation again suggested
the implementation of diversion programs.2 The viability of the concept
was supported by the Attorney General in 1971 in a speech to the Na-
tional Conference on Corrections, in which he included pretrial inter-
* Director, Dade County Pretrial Intervention Project, B.S., 1963, Columbia University;
J.D., 1966, Columbia University.
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 134 (1967), which recommended the "[early
identification and diversion to other community resources of those offenders in need of treat-
ment, for whom full criminal disposition does not appear required."
2. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRISON REHABILITATION, THE CRIMINAL OFFENDER-
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 22 (1970).
PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROJECT
vention as one of the objectives of the Nixon Administration's Justice
Department program.8
These endorsements of the diversion principle, as well as the ex-
perience of the intervention experiments now in operation, indicate a
relatively broad spectrum of support for the diversion strategy on the
part of the national criminal justice system's participants and critics,
irrespective of their proximity to the prosecution or defense positions
on that spectrum.4 It would seem, however, that the fact that all of the
existing intervention programs, with the exception of Operation Cross-
roads in Washington, D.C. and New York's Manhattan Court Employ-
ment Project, have been operational for a period of less than two years,
would indicate that the basis for the support must not consist, at least
in its entirety, of the statistical data that the experiments have thus far
generated.
It appears that to a great extent, two factors account for the ac-
ceptance of the intervention strategy to date: (1) The fact that diver-
sion is neither novel nor esoteric, but, in fact, provides formalization of
a long accepted concept, and (2) The intervention strategy is tailored to
the realities of our contemporary urban criminal justice systems.
A. Pretrial Diversion: Old Wine in a New Bottle
Although the scarcity of literature on the subject would indicate
otherwise,8 diversion from the prosecutorial system at any one of a num-
ber of points subsequent to the alleged commission of a criminal act, has
3. 10 Cimr. L. Rnv. 2239-40 (1971). The Attorney General stated that:
In many cases, society can best be served by diverting the accused to a voluntary
community-oriented correctional program instead of bringing him to trial . . . . I
am therefore directing the Executive Office of United States Attorneys and the
Criminal Division of the Justice Department to study the feasibility of enlarging
the area of criminal cases in which the prosecutor might be justified in deferring
prosecution in favor of an immediate community-oriented correctional program.
Id. at 2240.
4. Affirmative comment regarding the Dade County Project, for example, has been ex-
pressed by the Public Defender's Office (Letter from Philip A. Hubbart, Dade County Public
Defender, to Michael Samuel, Governor's Council on Criminal Justice, September 10, 1971);
State Attorney Richard E. Gerstein, who initiated the Project and whose office supervises its
operation (Letter from Richard E. Gerstein to Michael Samuel, Governor's Council on
Criminal Justice, September 9, 1971); Director Jack Sandstrom of the Dade County Cor-
rections and Rehabilitation Department (Letter from Jack Sandstrom to Thomas K. Peter-
sen, November 14, 1972); Director E. Wilson Purdy of the Dade County Public Safety De-
partment (Letter from Director Purdy to Thomas K. Petersen, December 4, 1972); and the
editors of the Miami Herald (Editorial, Miami Herald, June 12, 1972). The letters are on
file in the Office of the State Attorney.
5. The leading article on the subject is Brakel, Diversion From the Criminal Process:
Informal Discretion, Motivation, and Formalization, 48 DENVER L.J. 211 (1971); much of
the present section of this paper is based upon that work. See also Freedman, The Professional
Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEo. L.J. 1030, 1035-36 (1967); Kaplan, The
Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 174 (1965); Goldstein, Police Dis-
cretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration
of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1969).
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historically played a major and important role in the criminal justice
system, and has been an integral part of that system. It has been esti-
mated that a decision not to charge an apprehended offender is made in
one-third to one-half of all cases.'
The decision by a department store not to initiate the arrest and
prosecution of an apprehended shoplifter, based upon a reluctance to
become involved in a criminal case, coupled with recovery of the pil-
ferred merchandise; and, the reluctance of police officers to make arrests
in family disputes despite the fact that provable criminal acts have
taken place, based upon realistic determinations that it would be im-
provident to burden the courts with cases that will later be abandoned
by a reconciled spouse-victim, are examples of long existing diversion
methods.
Another point at which diversion has traditionally occurred has
been at the police station, where youthful first offenders have been the
beneficiaries of police decisions to employ a warning and to rely upon
parental punitive measures as alternatives to the utilization (and resul-
tant burdening) of the criminal justice system's resources.
Still another stage for diversion has been the prosecutor's office,
wherein, assuming police and victim have made the decision to arrest
and charge, the final decision whether to prosecute is made. Even in
those jurisdictions where prosecutors do not perceive their discretion as
permitting a decision not to prosecute except where the case is not prov-
able, major ingredients in a close question of provability are certainly
the character of the defendant and severity of the alleged offense. In
other prosecutorial offices, it is certainly not unusual for prosecutors to
defer prosecution based upon facts such as the defendant's offer to co-
operate in the solving of other cases.
A final stage in the post-arrest chain of events, at which diversion
occurs, if somewhat more subtly, is at the trial itself. Most prosecutors
are famaliar with the feelings of frustration inspired by an acquittal ex-
plainable solely upon a reluctance of the trier of fact to convict an ap-
pealing or sympathy-evoking defendant, despite overwhelming factual
evidence of guilt.
In his thorough analysis of traditional diversion methods such as
those discussed above, Samuel Brakel characterizes such practices as
lacking in formality, low in observability, and devoid of such institutional
elements as specialization of personnel and thorough data gathering and
reporting."7 Each of these characterizations are both accurately perceived
and significant. Lack of formality will result in arbitrariness; low observ-
ability may well breed diverse decisions based on favoritism or other
6. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TAE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 133 (1967).
7. Brakel, DIVERSION FROM THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: INFORMAL DISCRETION, MOTIVATION,
AND FORMALIZATION, 48 DENVER L.J. 211, 227 (1971).
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unacceptable inducements or considerations. Absence of data gathering
and reporting permit no evaluation of the efficiency of traditional diver-
sion, particularly in terms of economics and recidivism in comparison to
criminal prosecution. Finally, and most significantly, traditional diver-
sions of the types discussed above permit neither rehabilitative effort
nor supervision since, generally, they are not coupled with referral for
treatment or an evaluation designed to ascertain whether there exists a
need for treatment. In this sense, traditional diversion is more aptly de-
scribed as reversion to whatever status or condition preceded (and per-
haps inspired) the criminal act in the first place.
Despite these liabilities, however, the acceptance of traditional di-
version by both the public and the participants in the criminal justice sys-
tem has not been seriously questioned. Historically, there has been an
apparent consensus that some offenders, either due to age, background,
disability, or to a combination of these and other factors, might best be
handled by means other than criminal prosecution, be it by parental
authority, medical or psychiatric treatment, or merely by a decision that
the criminal act is trivial and unlikely to recur; and, that the best in-
terests of the actor and society would be served by not prosecuting.
The acceptance of diversion practices over the past decade un-
doubtedly has been heightened by the influx into the criminal justice
system of the large number of youthful narcotic offenders.8 In particu-
lar, the apparent softening of the public's attitude toward criminal treat-
ment of the youthful first-offender possessor of marijuana, coupled with
the persistence of a high volume of such offenders, will probably con-
tinue to provide an important area for both traditional and formalized
diversion, as will possession of other "soft" drugs by young first offen-
ders.' In these cases, there is a public willingness to view the offense as
not requiring the full application of the resources of the criminal justice
system. It is also recognized that the indiscriminate prosecution of each
and every such offender would spread even more thinly the already over-
8. The national increase in narcotic arrests in general, including marijuana, is illustrated
by the fact that in 1968 the increase in narcotic arrests from 1967 was 59.99%, an increase
that exceeded by 30% the next largest percentage increase in a crime category. Numerically,
the number of narcotic arrests in 1971 (323,337) was fourteen times the number of narcotic
arrests (23,430) in 1960, while the number of total arrests increased only by approximately
one half between 1960 (3.6 million) and 1971 (5.9 million). F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REP.
(1971). In Dade County in 1971, narcotics offenders represented 18.3% of the offenders
classified by the Corrections and Rehabilitation Department, numerically representing 1,352
of a total population of 7,386 offenders. REPORT OF DADE COUNTY CORRECTIONS AND RE-
HmiTrrATioN CLAssIFcATIoN SECTION, OCT. 1, 1971-SEPT. 30, 1972. In 1966, narcotics violators
represented only 3% of arrests. Study conducted by VISTA Bail Reform Project covering a
period from Nov. 1, 1966 to Oct. 31, 1967. This study is on file at the Office of the State
Attorney. Thus, in 1971, more than seven times as many narcotic offenders were arrested as
in 1966.
9. For example, 25% of offenders accepted for participation in the Dade County Inter-
vention Project during its initial year of operation were charged with marijuana possession.
FIRST ANN. REP.: DADE COUNTY PRERiIAL INTERVENTION PROJECT (1973).
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taxed resources of the system. These factors have always been basic
to all diversion decisions of whatever type.
Pretrial intervention programs, then, may be accurately regarded
as attempts to formalize a long-existing and extremely important com-
ponent of our criminal justice system. Despite the long standing accep-
tance and practice of the diversion strategy, it has not been until the re-
cent introduction of formal intervention programs, operated as profes-
sionally staffed components of urban prosecutorial offices, that the liabil-
ities inherent in traditional, informal diversion, as discussed above, have
been eliminated. In particular, such programs (1) operate formally, util-
izing procedures arrived at in conjunction with the prosecutor, defense
bar, police, and courts; (2) are high in observability by virtue of the
visibility of their procedures and decisions both to the public and to
the components of the criminal justice system; (3) are charged with
maintaining and reporting accurate data; and (4) utilize professional
personnel, afford diagnosis and supervision, and maintain coordination
and contact with available community rehabilitation and treatment
facilities.
B. The Pretrial Period and the Metropolitan Criminal Justice System
A second factor which would appear to account for the inception
and acceptance of the pretrial intervention strategy is its compatability
with the realities of the criminal court system in our major cities. A first
reality compatable with an intervention strategy is that a substantial
majority of individuals arrested and charged with criminal offenses have,
in fact, committed the acts alleged. Although of critical importance to the
trier of fact in a criminal case, the presumption of innocence is based on
considerations, albeit extremely important ones, which do not include
statistical probability. In Dade County, for example, during 1971-1972,
83% of defendants charged in the Dade Criminal Courts pleaded guilty
and only 2% requested trial by jury.1" As appears to be true in all major
cities, Dade County's criminal courts are neither structered nor
equipped, physically or philosophically, to afford a trial to all defendants
on the assumption that a large number of them are innocent. On the
contrary, the system functions upon the assumption that the great ma-
jority of cases will be disposed by guilty plea and numerous incentives
exist in the system to insure this result.
Secondly, based in theory upon the presumption of innocence and
perhaps also upon the practicalities of overcrowded facilities, virtually
10. Statistics provided by the clerk's office, Dade County Circuit Court, Criminal Divi-
sion. It would appear that, relative to the statistics available from other large metropolitan
areas, the percentage of non-guilty pleas in Dade County is extremely low. It has been esti-
mated, for example, that in New York City, 98% of criminal cases are disposed of by guilty
pleas. Testimony of Director Larson of the Duval County Public Safety Dept., Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Florida State Senate, Tallahassee, March 7, 1973.
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all youthful first offenders charged with non-violent offenses are re-
leased either on bond or in custody during the period between arrest and
trial, a period which may easily extend in duration to several months.
These releases are without supervision and, therefore, the community,
as a corollary, is without protection. Those community resources and
services, the inaccessibility of which may well have contributed to the
criminal act to begin with, are no more available to the defendant during
the period between arrest and trial than they were prior to the alleged
criminal act.
Because of the absence of supervision and of any use of community
resources during the period between arrest and trial, the pretrial period
also fails to utilize the psychological incentive potentially available in
the defendant's realization that a criminal charge, with the accompany-
ing possibility of conviction and incarceration, has been lodged against
him. The experience of the District of Columbia and New York City
Pretrial Intervention Projects has been that the threat of a pending
prosecution and incarceration may well be more of a deterrent than the
outcome of the prosecution itself.
Third, the substantial majority of youthful first offenders charged
with misdemeanors and third degree felonies are placed on probation if
convicted, and in a great many such cases, the probation is non-report-
ing." Probation caseloads are presently extremely large, and it follows
that during the probation period, supervision and rehabilitation, through
the offer and use of community resources, may well be only minimal for
the lesser offender. Also, once the offender has been placed on probation,
any rehabilitative incentive available in the threat of a pending prosecu-
tion is lost. It is the objective of the pretrial intervention project to util-
ize this incentive while making available to participants intensive super-
vision coupled with a coordinated use of community resources and reha-
bilitative facilities.
The pretrial intervention strategy makes possible supervision and
services during a period otherwise lacking such safeguards and consid-
erations, and simultaneously defers the filing and prosecution of the
case while an evaluation is made as to whether utilization of the re-
11. The trend to probation in Florida is illustrated by the following chart which illus-
trates disposition of all felony charges in the Florida Criminal Courts during the period be-
tween 1965 and 1971. Obviously, the percentage of non-violent first offenders receiving pro-
bation is much higher, estimated to be in the vicinity of 95%. The chart and statistics appear
in FLORIDA PAROLE & PROBATION Comm., 31ST ANN. REP. 1971.
Imprisonment Probation
Year Number Percent Number Percent
1965-66 3,010 62.5% 1,803 37.5%
1966-67 3,208 53.7% 2,761 46.3%
1967-68 3,288 53.2% 2,893 46.8%
1968-69 3,453 50.8% 3,333 49.2%
1969-70 3,584 43.8% 4,589 56.2%
1970-71 4,684 36.6% 8,122 63.4%
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sources of the courts will be required, or whether formalized diversion,
without prosecution, and without stigmatization of a criminal conviction,
will suffice. In a badly overcrowded court system, at a time when the
alternative of incarceration is coming to be regarded as increasingly
ineffective and little utilized for non-violent first offenders, and when
probation caseloads are so excessive as to make meaningful supervision
impossible, an intervention strategy which maximizes supervision and
rehabilitative services to those offenders for whom the criminal courts
or probation system presently have no response is both realistic and ap-
propriate.
II. THE DADE COUNTY PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROJECT
A. Antecendents
Although pretrial diversion of narcotic addicts was formalized in
1966 in the Federal Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act, 2 and addict
and alcoholic diversion provisions have been in existence in several
states,"8 the initial diversion program oriented toward the general of-
fender population was Operation Crossroads, a Washington, D.C. experi-
mental program which commenced in January of 1968. Shortly there-
after, the VERA Foundation, in New York, initiated the New York
Court Employment Project.
Based upon the reception accorded these two pilot programs, in
addition to the Dade County project, diversion programs now are oper-
ational in Philadelphia, Boston, San Francisco, Minneapolis, Newark,
Jersey City, Cleveland and Atlanta.
B. Eligibility Criteria
To be eligible for participation in the Dade County Pretrial Inter-
vention Project, an individual must meet the following criteria: (1) The
defendant must have no prior criminal conviction; (2) the defendant,
either male or female, must be between the ages of 17 and 25; (3) the
defendant must be charged with a non-violent offense; (4) the victim
and arresting officer must be consulted in writing and must concur in
program participation; and, (5) the defendant must be a Dade County
domiciliary.
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (1970).
13. Addict diversion programs currently exist in Connecticut, Illinois and Massachusetts.
Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the Criminal Justice System, 60 GEo.
L.J. 667, 676-80 (1972). See also Robertson, Pretrial Diversion of Drug Offenders: A Stat-
utory Approach, 52 BOSTON U.L. REV. 335 (1972); Neisser, Diversion of Alcoholics from
the Criminal Process: The Intoxication Provision of the Connecticut Penal Code, 45 CONN.
B.J. 289 (1971).
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C. Structure and Methods
The Dade County Pretrial Intervention Project, which began oper-
ation on January 17, 1972, is funded by the Florida Bureau of Criminal
Justice Planning and Assistance, using monies made available by the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The grant appli-
cation was prepared by the Office of the State Attorney and submitted
by the Dade County Board of Commissioners.
The primary objective of the Project is to provide, for a three to
six month period immediately following arrest, intensive counseling and
manpower services, as well as referrals to community agencies where
warranted. The staff consists of professional and paraprofessional coun-
selors, a psychologist and a manpower and vocational guidance aide. The
counselors attempt to establish and maintain close contact with the par-
ticipants by means of home visits, visits to the job or training location
at which the participant may have been placed, and to the Project's
office. Contact with participants is made by the counselors as often as is
necessary with a minimum of two contacts per week. A counselor's case-
load is not to exceed twenty participants and group counseling sessions
are held at least one evening per week.
On a daily basis, the Project director attends the bail bond hearing
held in the Committing Magistrate Section of the County Court of Dade
County. After reviewing these jail interview sheets, those first offenders
who appear to be eligible for Project participation are listed on a daily
memo which is circulated to those assistant state attorneys in the pretrial
unit who review the defendant's case, along with the recommendation
and proposed rehabilitation plan of the Project director. This rehabili-
tative plan is formulated by the director and staff following an in-depth
interview of the defendant and his family and an identification of
those areas in which Project services seem required. If approved, the
arresting officer and victim in the case are contacted and the program
and the proposed rehabilitation plan in the particular case are explained
to them. Assuming their consent, the filing of charges is withheld for a
three to six month period to permit Project participation. Periodic prog-
ress reports are submitted to the Project director. At the conclusion of
three months, a final evaluation is submitted on the basis of which one
of four possible courses of action may be followed:
1. In the event of successful participation, a No Information
of the charge may be recommended by the State Attorney's
Office with the result of preserving for this group partici-
pants a record devoid of a criminal conviction due to the
dismissal of charges;
2. The case may be filed, in the event participation is not
deemed to have been satisfactory;
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3. The case may be filed with a report of satisfactory per-
formance to the trial assistant in the event filing is deemed
necessary, with the satisfactory performance to serve as a
determinant in sentencing; or
4. Project participation may be extended for an additional
period.
D. Results: January 17, 1972-January 18, 1974
The Pretrial Intervention Project began operation on January 17,
1972. During the two year period through January 18, 1974, the
structure, staffing and procedures for the Project were established, par-
ticipant intake and servicing commenced and participant numbers have
increased at at rate in excess of that anticipated.
During the period, a total of 1,416 cases were identified as poten-
tially eligible for Project participation. Of these, the Project ultimately
found 560 to be unacceptable. Reasons for rejection were failure to re-
spond to the initial letter mailed to potential participants, failure to pass
screening, for which defendants were not serviced. Persons screened
failed to pass either because of lack of interest in the Project, lack of
need for Project services, or due to the facts revealed in the pre-intake
investigation of the potential participants. 797 cases were actually ac-
cepted for participation and have been offered Project services. Thirty-
four more, during the initial twelve months of operation, were randomly
assigned to a control group created in order to aid in Project evaluation.
Another twenty-five potential participants were on pending status as
this report was prepared.
The 797 actual participants were divided into the following groups:
Group I: Participants whose cases are not filed during
Project participation, to last a period of three to six months.
Successful participation in Group I results in dismissal of
charges.
Group H: Participants whose cases have been filed and
who are not eligible for participation in Group I, due, for exam-
ple, to lack of consent by arresting officer, but who are ser-
viced by the Project in the same maner as Group I partici-
pants. Successful completion in Group II results in a with-
holding of adjudication and a period of probation not to ex-
ceed two years.
Group III: Participants whose cases have been judi-
cially disposed of, but who voluntarily express a desire to con-
tinue Project participation and who are accepted for contin-
ued participation.
The following table lists the number of participants'or former par-
1973 ] PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROJECT 95
ticipants in each of the above groups, as well as unaccepted non-partici-
pants as of January 19, 1974.
A. Participants:
Group I
A ctive ........................................................... 179
Closed by Successful Project
Completion & Case Dismissal .................................. 349
Closed by Unsuccessful participation &
reversion to normal channels .................................. 61
Group II
A ctive ........................................................... 23
Closed with Successful Project
Completion Report to Prosecutor .............................. 88
Closed w/o Successful Project
Completion Report to Prosecutor .............................. 68
Group III
A ctive ........................................................... 4
C losed ........................................................... 25
Total Participants (Jan., 1972-Jan., 1974) .................................. 797
B. Non-Participants:
Control Group ...................................................... 34
Pending ............................................................. 25
N ot Accepted ........................................................ 560
Total (Jan., 1972-Jan., 1974) .............................................. 619
The rates of new case intake and of case disposition during the
eight three-month quarters of Project operation are illustrated in the
following Tables:
1. NEW CASE INTAKE PER QUARTER: JANUARY 18, 1972-JANUARY 18, 1974
1/18/72- 4/18/72- 7/18/72- 10/18/72- 1/18/73- 4/18/73- 7/18/73- 10/18/73-
Group 4/18/72 7/18/72 10/18/72 1/18/73 4/18/73 7/18/73 10/18/73 1/18/74 Total
I 20 41 57 41 95 94 80 169 598
II 20 24 19 12 19 39 15 21 169
III 3 3 9 3 2 4 1 5 30
Total 43 68 85 56 116 137 97 195 797
2. CASE DisPosrrION PER QUARTER: JANUARY 18, 1972-JANUARY 18, 1974
1/72- 4/72- 7/72- 10/72- 1/73- 4/73- 7/73- 10/73-
Group 4/72 7/72 10/72 1/73 4/73 7/73 10/73 1/74 Total
I-Successful 0 8 32 31 37 85 94 62 349
Unsuccessful 5 3 5 6 9 11 8 14 61
II-Successful 4 10 10 10 16 17 9 12 88
Unsuccessful 5 10 12 5 9 14 11 2 68
III-Successful 2 3 5 3 1 2 4 5 25
Unsuccessful 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 16 34 64 55 72 129 126 95 591
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3. COMiPARATivE TOTAL CASE INTAKE AND CASE DISPOSITION PER QUARTER:
JANUARY 18, 1972-JANUARY 18, 1974
i/72- 4/72-- 7/72- 10/72- 1/73- 4/73- 7/73- 10/73-
4/72 7/72 10/72 1/73 4/73 7/73 10/73 1/74
1. EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION
As noted previously, a principal objective of the Dade County Pre-
trial Intervention Project, as well as of pretrial diversion programs in
general, is the reduction of unemployment and underemployment and
the provision of incentives toward vocational training or continued edu-
cational advancement.
In order to evaluate Project activity in these areas, computer analy-
sis, conducted by the Data Processing Center of Miani-Dade Junior
College, compared questionnaires administered to successful Project par-
ticipants upon acceptance for participation and at a follow-up interview
three to six months subsequent to Project completion. The following
table presents some principal findings:
Enrolled in School
Employed
Unskilled
Semi-skilled
Skilled
Employed Full Time
Report Liking Job
Held Present Employment
at least Three Months
Pre-acceptance
30%
45%
3-6 Months Post
Completion
42%
50%
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2. COUNSELING
In addition to the placement of Project participants in productive
endeavors, all are under the intensive supervision of staff counselors
who meet with participants at least twice weekly, including one weekly
group counseling session conducted at the Project field office. Addition-
ally, special vocational, family, and psychological counseling is pro-
vided by the program consultants in those cases where referrals appear
to be warranted.
As a means of evaluating the effect of Project participation gener-
ally, and the counseling component in particular, the Sixteen Person-
ality Factor Questionnaire Form E (16 PF) has been administered to
all Project participants upon acceptance for participation, and at a
follow-up interview three to six months subsequent to participation.
Those participants who have successfully completed the Project, reveal
mean changes of greater than .5 points in the following eight directions
of those sixteen characteristics measured by the Test, as tabulated by
the Data Processing Center of Miami-Dade Community College:
1. More enthusiastic (less taciturn): average change 1.38
2. More spontaneous (less threat sensitive): average change
1.01
3. More controlled (less impulsive): average change .89
4. More concrete thinking (less abstract thinking): average
change .67
5. More sensitive (less tough-minded): average change .67
6. More self-sufficient (less group-dependent): average change
.52
7. More self-assured (less apprehensive): average change .67
8. More emotionally stable (less emotionally unstable): aver-
age change .55
It would be hoped that these positive developmental trends, when
tested by further follow-up research, will prove to be enduring ones.
3. RECIDIVISM
An important objective of the Project is to promote a minimal
recidivism rate. To assist in the evaluation of this phase of Project per-
formance, a control group comparable in all respects to Project partici-
pants was selected pursuant to a research design prepared by Alan
Rockway, Ph.D.
The following table presents the recidivism statistics as of January
19, 1973, for each of the successfully completed participant groups (I,
II, and III) and for the Control Group. These figures are based upon
computer verification through the National Crime Information Center.
National Crime Information Center inquiries are made yearly so as to
identify any recidivism by former participants which has not been re-
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vealed in the follow-up questionnaires which are completed by previous
participants for one year pursuant to successful completion.
RECIDIVISM OF PRETRIAL COMPLETORS AND CONTROLS
Percent By Group
Frequency Percent Total Completors
Group Number Rearrests Rearrests vs Controls
I 72 2 2.8
II 35 0 0 1.6
III 13 0 0
Control 34 7 20.6 20.6*
* Chi square test corrected X 2 = 14.00 Significant p, < .001.
Of the total 120 successful Project participants as of January 19,
1973 (Groups I, II and III), only two were rearrested, yielding a recidi-
vism rate of 1.6% among successfully completed participants. This com-
pares favorably to the control group of 34 individuals (based on 12
cases with complete, initial and follow-up interviews and tests and an
additional 22 cases on which only recidivism data was obtained). Of the
34 controls studied for recidivism, seven were rearrested as of January
19, 1973, yielding a recidivism rate of 20.6%.
A chi square test incorporating the Yates correction factor was ap-
plied to these recidivism figures. This test yields a computed value of
X2 of 14.00 (p, .001) and indicates that the difference between recidi-
vism rates of completors vs. controls is highly significant. Therefore it
is apparent that these observed differences in recidivism were due to ser-
vices rendered to the successful completors and not merely to chance.
Further research will be required to determine which specific Project
services were most effective in promoting these differences.
An additional comparison of recidivism data was performed in
which recidivism of successful completors was compared to both that of
controls and those who failed to successfully complete the Project and
were returned to the normal criminal justice channels for disposition.
This comparison is presented in the table below and is necessary to eval-
uate total Project effectiveness in terms of total experimental cases (suc-
cesses and failures) vs. the controls in the area of recidivism.
RECIDIVISM OF PRETRIAL EXPERIM[ENTALS VS. CONTROLS
Frequency Percent Percent by Group
Group Description Number Rearrests Rearrests Totals Rearrests
I I S.C.* 72 2 2.8
II II S.C. 35 0 0 Total
III III S.C. 13 0 0 Experimentals 8.8
IV I Failures 19 8 42.0
V II Failures 32 5 16.0 Total
Control Control 34 7 20.6 Controls 20.6**
* S.C. = Successful Completors
** Chi square test corrected X2 = 3.03 Significant p, < .05.
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Of the total 171 experimental cases (120 successful; 51 unsuccess-
ful completors) in groups I, II, III, IV and V, only 15 were rearrested
yielding a total Project recidivism rate (experimental group) of 8.8%.
This again compares favorably to the control group recidivism rate of
20.6%.
A similar chi square test applied to these total figures yields a com-
puted value of X2 of 3.03 (p, < .05) and indicates that the difference
between recidivism rates of all Project participants (both successes and
failures) and the controls is significant.
These statistics, although heartening, should be viewed with cau-
tion in view of the short period of time elapsed between Project com-
pletion and recidivism inquiry. Future inquiries are anticipated more
frequently and will undoubtedly provide a better picture of long term
Project effectiveness on recidivism.
III. PRETRIAL INTERVENTION: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
An important test of the efficacy of formalized pretrial intervention
is that of economy. To be viable, such programs should be no more costly
to the criminal justice system than would be the disposition of cases by
the traditional means of prosecution followed by incarceration or pro-
bation.
Intervention programs are for the most part limited to first offen-
ders while, of course, probation and prison cannot and do not select
their intake. For this reason, comparison of these three approaches to
rehabilitation in terms of recidivism are misleading at best. However,
it is submitted that the three treatments can be evaluated in terms of
costs of processing through the criminal justice system and in terms of
earnings, or loss thereof, of the arrested offender. The following costs
must be considered in comparing the three approaches:
Pretrial Inter-
Incarceration Probation vention Program
Criminal act Criminal act Criminal act
Arrest Arrest Arrest
Court costs Court costs Program costs
Prison costs Probation costs
Loss of earnings
Since the costs of crimes and of subsequent arrests and booking
may be assumed to be constant, the following analysis will not include
these factors. Nor will it include the factor of loss of earnings (and
possible welfare costs to society of supporting a family that has been
deprived of its breadwinner) of the incarcerated offender since it is be-
yond the scope of this paper to estimate the relative earnings of an of-
fender on probation or in a pretrial intervention program. Since both
probation and pretrial intervention require an offender to work, and in
fact place him in employment, it may be assumed that both of these ap-
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proaches result in a social benefit that is absent when the offender is
incarcerated.
This paper, then, will confine itself to a discussion of the economic
costs of resources used in the criminal justice system and estimate the
marginal costs to society for police, courts and personnel. For the pur-
pose of estimating the marginal cost of judicial proceedings, only costs
of labor will be included. This method of estimating the court costs will
be a simple summation of the personnel involved in a court event and
their respective annual salaries divided by the number of cases handled
by these personnel in a year.
Since successful completion of pretrial intervention program parti-
cipation results in a decision by the state attorney not to prosecute the
offender, the following events are eliminated:
(1) clerical preparation of the case by the state attorney's
office;
(2) filing of the case by the criminal court clerk;
(3) arraignment and motions;
(4) defense and prosecution costs;
(5) witness and police officer appearance for depositions and
trial (and resulting loss of earnings and inconvenience);
(6) court costs;
(7) costs of incarceration or probation.
It should be noted that all of these costs are incurred when a case
is processed normally, with probation or incarceration the outcome. The
benefits derived by eliminating these costs and by diverting a case into
pretrial intervention will herein be referred to as the diversion benefit.
As mentioned previously, although the increased earnings benefit
will not be dealt with, the project employment staff develops and main-
tains contacts with training programs, with area employers (both public
and private), and with the public employment service. The benefits de-
rived from providing job information and placement assistance to parti-
cipants, thereby reducing the number and length of unsuccessful job
searches and thus increasing earnings over a given period of time, are
evident. The counseling of participants serves to increase motivation,
resulting in fewer job changes and shorter periods between jobs. If indi-
viduals are placed in training programs or in employment providing on-
the-job training, skills and productivity may increase, providing still
further benefits.
The budgetary costs of the Pretrial Intervention Project staff dur-
ing 1972-74 were as follows:
Personnel $171,915
Contractual services 36,750
Travel mileage 9,100
Equipment 2,900
Operating expenses 16,450
Total $237,115
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Based upon the total 595 cases closed as a result of Project partici-
pation, the average cost per case14 is:
$237,115 = $398.50
595
A. Benefits from Case Diversion to Pretrial Intervention
The following analyses assume that recidivism rates among former
pretrial intervention participants will be no higher than those of offen-
ders whose cases have resulted in incarceration or probation. In fact,
although it is too early to conclusively evaluate the Dade County Pro-
gram on these terms, the experience of similar programs in New York and
Washington has been that recidivism rates have in fact been lower than
among probation or jail cases. Obviously, the benefit gained from the
demand for court and corrections resources where pretrial intervention is
used could be rapidly reversed if this type of program led to increased
recidivism.
1. COURT COSTS THROUGH CASE DISPOSITION
The following calculations are designed to estimate the cost of the
average case to the criminal justice system. Since cases filed in the crim-
inal court are disposed of in three principal ways, to-wit: jury trial, non-
jury trial and guilty plea, the average case is a composite of these three
means of disposition. Obviously a jury trial is more costly than a non-
jury trial (involving, for example, increased court time due to the neces-
sity of selecting jurors, loss of earnings to jurors, etc.), which in turn
is more costly than a guilty plea. The following table presents the means
of case disposition from July 1, 1971 to June 30, 1972, in the Dade
County criminal courts:
Means of
Case Disposal Number of Cases15  Percent
Guilty plea 7,360 83%
Non-jury trial 1,290 15%y
Jury trial 214 2%
8,864 100%
The following table presents the various elements, and their costs
per year, that comprise the costs of cases in the criminal justice system:
14. It should be noted that not measured in this calculation is the benefit to those cases
serviced who do not ultimately merit case dismissal, but who do receive benefits from project
participation and services.
15. The estimates of total cases and clerk's office expenses were provided by the criminal
court clerk's office. The estimates of prosecution and defense costs were provided by the
offices of the state attorney and public defender respectively. The other estimates of inci-
dental expenses were obtained from the Dade County Budget Department.
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Expense Item16  Amount Per Year
Judges' salaries $ 142,500
Judges' bailiffs & secretaries 70,000
Clerk's office 204,800
Witness fees 300,000
Prosecution 1,200,000
Public defender 500,000
Court reporters 775,000
$3,192,300
Dividing this total by the total number of criminal court cases per
year, we obtain the cost of processing of an average case through the
criminal courts:
3,192,300
8,864 $360
Added to this figure must be the cost of police witnesses in an indi-
vidual case. This has been estimated 7 at $44.46 per case. Added to $360,
this results in an expense of $404.46 per case.
2. POST-DISPOSITION COSTS
In addition to the benefits to the criminal justice system incurred
by circumventing costs of case processing in the courts, the benefits in-
curred by case dismissal, following a participant's successful completion
of the program, as compared to the costs of incarceration or probation,
must also be included.
As mentioned earlier, 63.4% of criminal cases in 1971 resulted in
probation and 36.6% in incarceration. Since these figures include all
offenders, and since pretrial intervention is limited to first offenders, who
comprise approximately one-third of all offenders, these percentages
should be adjusted to reflect these facts. Therefore, it will be assumed
that .366 X 1/3 of total first offenders are incarcerated and the remain-
der received probation. Thus 12% of first offenders would be incarcer-
ated and 88% would receive probation.
The assumption is herein made that the average length of a first
16. Not included in the estimate is the indirect private and social costs of lack of earn-
ings and productivity of a witness who must leave his job to appear in court.
17. The estimate of police costs are based on estimates provided by the Dade County
Public Safety Department. Also, this assumes that the average case bound over to the
criminal court will involve two public safety officers and a minimum court time of six hours
each. Approximately half of the officers appear in court while on duty, therefore, hourly
rates should be figured at time and one half for at least one of the officers involved using
the middle range of $4.94 per hour for police officer classification. Thus, the calculation here
is ($4.94 + $4.94) X 6 hours = $44.46 per case. It should be noted that an extremely im-
2
portant social benefit of freeing police officers from in-court, on-duty time is the fact that
they are then available for crime detection and prevention functions that would otherwise
be unavailable.
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offender's incarceration is six months and the average length of a first
offender's probation is two years.'
The 1971 Report of the Florida Probation and Parole Commis-
sion estimated the marginal cost of supervising an additional proba-
tioner at $242 per year and the marginal cost of incarceration of an
additional inmate at $2,219 per year.
Assuming that 12% of the 349 offenders whose cases were dismissed
following successful participation in the Pretrial Intervention Project
would otherwise have been incarcerated for six months and 88% placed
on probation for two years, the following costs may be estimated:
Number
of Cases Cost per Case Total Cost
Incarceration 42 $1,108 $ 46,536
Probation 307 $ 484 $148,588
349 $195,124
These figures must be discounted and the rate of discount will be
selected at 10%: The calculations assume a six month incarceration and
two years of probation:
Incarceration Probation
Present _ 1,108 Present 484
Value - (1.10) = $997 Value (1.10)2
3. TOTAL COSTS: PRE- AND POST-DISPOSITIONAL
The total costs of processing and disposition of the 349 cases who
successfully completed the Pretrial Intervention Project may thus be
expressed as follows:
Pre-disposition + Post-disposition = Total benefits
costs per case costs per case
Or:
Pretrial intervention case: 0 + $398.50 = $ 398.50 per case
Probation case: $404 + $400.00 = $ 804.00 per case
Incarceration case: $404 + $997.00 = $1,401.00 per case
Again assuming an 88%-121% ratio of probation to incarceration
cases, we may calculate total benefits as follows:
Probation cases = 804 X 307 = $246,828
Incarceration cases = 1,401 X 42 = 58,842
Total $305,670
18. This estimate is necessarily extremely subjective, being based on the author's ex-
perience and that of attorneys in the Dade County criminal courts.
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4. SUMMARY
The above estimates of the costs of the handling of 349 cases by
the method of diversion to a Pretrial Intervention Project and by the
traditional means of probation and incarceration may be summarized
as follows:
Pretrial intervention costs (349 cases) $139,076
Probation/incarceration costs (349 cases) $305,670
It is thus less costly to divert a case to the Dade County Pretrial
Intervention Project than to process it in the traditional manner with
disposition either by probation or incarceration. The following presents
the cost-benefit ratio of this diversion aspect of the Pretrial Interven-
tion Project:
Total costs of program $139,076
Total diversion benefit $305,670
Benefit-cost ratio 2.19
Although the diversion benefit of the Project in itself is economi-
cally efficient relative to alternative methods of case processing, it must
again be emphasized that a cost-benefit analysis of such a Project is not
complete without a consideration of the earnings benefit, resulting from
the increased productivity of participants, and the recidivism benefit.
A recent FBI survey of offenders released in 1968 found that 60% to
75% were rearrested within five years. 9 If the recidivism rate of pre-
trial intervention participants, during enrollment and over a period of
time after leaving the Project, is lower than it would have been had they
not participated in the Project, it can be said that society has addition-
ally benefited. 20
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, however, it may be said that
if the recidivism and earnings benefits accruing from pretrial interven-
tion strategy are the same or greater than accruing from incarceration
or probation, that being due to benefits from the diversion of the case
from the criminal court processing and disposition, then the Dade Coun-
ty Project represents an efficient allocation of resources within Dade
County's criminal justice system.
IV. FROM INNOVATION TO INSTITUTION:
EMERGING ISSUES IN DIVERSION PROGRAMS
As diversion programs proliferate and expand, along with their in-
creased institutionalization in our criminal justice systems, there will
come the recognition that such programs present problems, both legal
and administrative, which must be dealt with, presumably in the near
future. To date that unique feature of the diversion program, its com-
19. F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REP. 37 (1968).
20. See text at page 25 et. seq.
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patibility with the goals of both prosecutor and defense attorney, has
kept to a minimum legal attacks on program methods and procedure.
Yet this compatibility should not obscure other incipient issues, some of
which are presented below.
A. The Issue of Prosecutorial Discretion: Is it an Abuse of the Prose-
cutor's Discretion to Withhold the Filing of an Information Pend-
ing Participation in a Pretrial Diversion Program?
An initial issue which must be recognized prior to instituting an in-
tervention program is whether the prosecutor has the right to choose not
to prosecute a particular defendant based upon his or her participation
in such a program. The question is a particularly salient one in a pro-
gram such as exists in Dade County due to the practice there employed
of withholding the filing of an information when a program participant
is selected, thus eliminating judicial involvement in the diversion process.
In Florida and in other jurisdictions where the issue has been raised in
other contexts, existing case law seems clearly to uphold prosecutorial
discretion in decisions relating to initiation of prosecutions, and a de-
cision to withhold the filing of an information pending participation in
an intervention program would appear to represent a valid exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
The Florida Statutes applicable to the duties of the state attorney
do not deal specifically with the duty of the prosecutor to file or with-
hold filing of an information. The applicable statutes are section 27.02
of the Florida Statutes (1973), which states that "[t]he State Attorney
shall appear in the circuit court within his judicial circuit, and prosecute
or defend on behalf of the state all suits, applications or motions, civil
or criminal, in which the state is a party," and section 32.18(1) of the
Florida Statutes (1973), which states "[a]ll offenses triable in the crim-
inal courts of record shall be prosecuted upon information under oath,
to be filed by the county solicitor." The latter section is made applicable
to the state attorney by article 5, section 9B of the Florida Constitution
which directs that "the [Dade County] State Attorney and his Assistant
State Attorneys, under his direction, shall perform all of the duties and
functions of office heretofore performed by the County Solicitor."
In Florida, and in all other jurisdictions where issue of prosecutorial
discretion has been considered by the courts, the general principle has
been stated as follows:
A duty rests upon a district or prosecuting attorney to prose-
cute the violators of the criminal laws of the state whom he
knows or has reason to believe to be guilty of such violations.
However, this duty is not absolute, but qualified, requiring of
him only the exercise of a sound discretion, which permits him
to refrain from prosecuting, or having commenced a prosecu-
tion, to enter a nolle prosequi, whenever he, in good faith and
without corrupt motives or influences, thinks that a prosecu-
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tion would not serve the best interests of the state, or that,
under the circumstances, a conviction could not be had, or that
the guilt of the accused is doubtful or not capable of adequate
proof.21
This principle was stated and followed in a 1951 Florida Attorney
General's Opinion wherein the question was posed: "What limitations
are there on the discretion of the County Solicitor in deciding not to file
an information, which will make his decision a criminal offense?" In
that instance, the County Solicitor refused to file a manslaughter infor-
mation against a defendant who had been bound over by a Justice of the
Peace. The opinion states that:
If, after the county solicitor investigates the facts in a
bindover case or in a case in which he initiates an independent
investigation, he concludes in good faith that the evidence does
not warrant the filing of an information, his failure to file an
information is not a crime, regardless of whether or not his de-
cision accords with what someone else might think, and even
though it might appear to someone else that the county solici-
tor is neglecting his duty by not prosecuting.
I find no statute making it a crime for a county solicitor
to neglect his duty. The result is that the common law governs.
At common law, an officer is not criminally liable for failure
to perform his discretionary duty unless that failure is a willful
and corrupt failure .... 11
The case law in Florida follows the reasoning of the Attorney Gen-
eral Opinion. 21 Moreover the cases in other jurisdictions, with near un-
animity, support the discretion of the prosecutor not to file an informa-
tion where this discretion is exercised in good faith. The law is clear that
21. 42 Am. JUR. Prosecuting Attorneys 17 (Supp. 1950) (emphasis added).
22. FLA. ATT'y GEN. Op. 051-125 (1951) (unpublished). The opinion cites as precedents
Sullivan v. Letherman, 48 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1950); La Tour v. Stone, 139 Fla. 681, 190 So.
704 (1939); State ex rel. Tatham v. Coleman, 122 Fla. 819, 166 So. 221 (1936); Ex Parte
Amos, 94 Fla. 1023, 114 So. 760 (1927); Ex parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289 (1927); 67
C.J.S. Officers § 133(b) (1950). Also cited is Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264,
134 N.E. 407 (1922), which upheld a prosecutor's refusal to file an information. The opinion
concludes:
I agree with the Massachusetts court's reasoning on this point. Therefore, I think
that if a county solicitor is requested by relatives of the deceased not to prosecute
manslaughter charges arising out of an automobile collision, he will be guilty of no
crime if he complies with such request without any corrupt, evil or improper motive
and in the honest belief that the request outweighs other considerations which might
appear to demand prosecution . . . Section 925.01, F.S., merely makes it a mis-
demeanor for an officer to wilfully fail, refuse and omit to perform any duty re-
quired of him by the Criminal Procedure Law (Chs. 901-25, F.S.), or to wilfully
violate any of the provisions thereof. I find nothing in the Criminal Procedure Law
regulating or in any way pertaining to the duty of a prosecuting attorney to file
information. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the failure of a county solicitor
to file an information cannot under any circumstances constitute a violation of
§ 925.01.
23. Prevatt v. State, 135 Fla. 226, 184 So. 860 (1938) ; Anderson v. State, 134 Fla. 290,
183 So. 735 (1938); Di Bona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
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the office of the prosecutor "is vested with a vast quantum of discretion
which is necessary for the vindication of the public interest.
' 24
In several cases a prosecutor's decision not to file a particular infor-
mation has been attacked on equal protection grounds and this attack
has been consistently dismissed on the ground that equal protection does
not require identity of treatment. 5
B. Participant Selection Issues: Who is Selected and What is Required
of the Eligible Defendant?
As mentioned earlier, selectivity in the choice of diversion subjects
represents an important factor in program acceptance and institutional-
ization in terms of political saleability, in the provision of personalized
and intensive services, as well as in the demonstration of acceptable re-
sults. Most diversion programs are limited to young first offenders charged
with particular offenses. The Dade County program, for example, is
limited to first offenders between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five
who are charged with non-violent crimes.
It is clear that "[e] qual protection does not require that all persons
be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have
24. Granger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 590
(3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967). In United States v. Shaw, 226 A.2d 366,
368 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967), the court stated: "On the District Attorney rests the responsibility
to determine whether to prosecute, when to prosecute and on what charges to prosecute."
This broad discretion is emphasized in numerous cases; and the courts consistently refuse
to order the prosecutor to initiate prosecutions on the ground that the initiation of a prosecu-
tion is a discretionary act and, as such, one that may not be compelled by mandamus. Powell
v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966); Brack v.
Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1944) ; Leone v. Fanelli, 87 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Sup. Ct.
1949); Murphy v. Sumners, 54 Tex. Crim. 369, 112 S.W. 1070 (Ct. App. 1908). "It is clear
that in his functions as a prosecutor he has great discretion in determining whether or not
to prosecute. There is no obligation or duty upon a district attorney to prosecute all com-
plaints that may be filed with him." State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368,
378, 166 N.W.2d 255, 260 (1969). As is pointed out in State v. Reed, 127 Vt. 532, 253 A.2d
227 (1969), the prosecutor's discretion not to prosecute is routinely exercised in decisions to
grant immunity to one accused of the commission of a crime. See also 27 C.J.S. District &
Prosecuting Attorneys § 10 (1959); Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1057
(1955). Further, in State v. LeVien, 44 N.J. 323, 209 A.2d 97 (1965), the court stated that
the prosecutor's discretion not to file prevailed over even a defendant's demand to have
proceedings instituted against himself.
25. See Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where the court
stated: "[W]hether or not the prosecutor's discretion in law enforcement is coextensive with
the legislature's in law enactment, it is by its very nature exceedingly broad." In Newman
v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967), Justice Burger, then sitting on the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, wrote that
[t]wo persons may have committed what is precisely the same legal offense but the
prosecutor is not compelled by law, duty or tradition to treat them the same as to
charges. On the contrary, he is expected to exercise discretion and common sense to
the end that if, for example, one is a young first offender and the other older, with
a criminal record, or one played a lesser and the other a dominant role, one the
instigator and the other a follower, the prosecutor can and should take such factors
into account; no court has any jurisdiction to inquire into or review his decision.
id. at 481-82 (footnote omitted).
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some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.1126
Thus, it would appear incumbent upon diversion programs that their
acceptance criteria, in order to afford equal protection, be relevant to
the rehabilitative objectives of the programs.
It would clearly appear that exclusion based upon sex would be vio-
lative of the defendant's right to equal protection of the laws. No exist-
ing intervention program is limited to participants of a particular sex,
although the prototype Project Crossroads 27 was initially limited to
males, apparently without legal challenge. Restrictions limited to resi-
dents would seem justifiable only where lack of residency precludes a
defendant from being physically present to receive Project services, and
exclusion based upon mere non-residency without a showing of ration-
ality might well be deemed unconstitutional. 8
While most programs impose age restrictions, it would appear that
rational arguments may be advanced to support such an admission cri-
teria. In addition to the fact that an inverse correlation exists between
the age of offenders seventeen and above and the incidence of criminal
activity,29 the administration of a diversion program and its choice of
methodology is simplified where participant population is homogeneous.
Further, a convincing argument may be advanced for the proposition
that youth, malleability and rehabilitative potential are greater among
younger offenders than among their older counterparts. The fact that
age limitations result in a demonstrable concentration of resources in the
area wherein need is most acute would in probability sustain such cri-
teria against attack on equal protection grounds.
The general restriction concerning prior records of conviction and
violent crimes may also be defended as constitutionally reasonable for
26. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). See also Walters v. City of St. Louis,
347 U.S. 231 (1954).
27. See section II supra.
28. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969), stated that under traditional equal
protection tests, a classification of welfaxe applicants according to whether they have lived
in a state for one year was irrational and unconsitutional. The Court went on to note, how-
ever, that the traditional tests were not applicable since a fundamental right (i.e., interstate
movement) was involved; the test to be applied was one of compelling state interest. Id.
at 638.
29. The 1971 F.B.I. UNIFoPum Caim REPORTS (1971), reveal that of those persons ar-
rested for crimes in 1971, 53.6% were under 25 years of age and 39.7% under 21. When
those arrests are subdivided into crimes against property, which is the principal category
of diversion cases, and crimes against the person, the statistics reveal that 80.2% of those
arrested for crimes against property are under 25 and 68% are under 21. The figures for
crimes against the person are 59.3% under 25 and 40.1% under 21 years of age.
The relationship of youth to crime appears to be even more pronounced in Dade
County: Of 6,704 arrested persons classified by the Dade County Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation in 1971, 34.7% were between the ages of 17 and 21 and a total of 59.6%
were between 17 and 25 years of age. REPORT OF DADE CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION
CLASSIFICATION SECTION, Oct. 1, 1971-Sept. 30, 1972. The Dade County survey did not include
offenders under the age of 17, unlike the F.B.I. figures, since these younger offenders are
processed by the Department of Youth Services. Obviously their inclusion would augment
the percentages considerably. As previously mentioned, the Dade County Pretrial Interven-
tion Program age criterion is seventeen to twenty-five.
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much the same reasons as in the case of age restrictions: intervention
programs, it should be remembered, utilize the incentive of a dismissal of
pending charges and preservation of an unblemished record; such incen-
tives are of minimal value when offered to an offender who has previ-
ously been convicted of one or more offenses and whose record is al-
ready stigmatized. Also, violent crime is often characterized by motiva-
tional factors outside the scope of the services made available by most
diversion programs.8"
In addition to relatively restricted admission criteria, most pro-
grams are characterized by a requirement that potential participants
execute either a waiver of demand for speedy trial or a written plea of
guilty or both.
In Florida, section 918.015 of the Florida Statutes (1973), guaran-
tees a defendant the right to a speedy trial and pursuant to Rule 3.191
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, this right obliges the state
to bring a defendant to trial within 90 days from the time such person
is taken into custody if charged with a misdemeanor, and within 180
days if the charge is a felony. The defendant may, however, by his ac-
tion or inaction, waive this right to speedy trial81 and such a waiver is,
of course, necessary as a prerequisite to participation in a program which
will effect a withholding of prosecution for a period which will often ex-
ceed the time limitations. When a participant is unsuccessfully termi-
nated from the program after having participated, it is necessary that an
executed waiver be filed to assure that the case may be prosecuted. Inso-
far as a potential participant's waiver of speedy trial demand is volun-
tary and intelligent, the requirement would not seem objectionable. Al-
though the Dade County Program diverts a participant prior to the filing
of an information, 2 the fact that the decision of whether to waive the
right to speedy trial in favor of Program participation may well be the
most important decision the arrested defendant may make, would seem
to bring the act within the definition of a "critical stage" of the criminal
proceeding at which the right to counsel exists.38
30. See e.g., Dowd v. Stuckey, 222 Ind. 100, 51 N.E.2d 947 (1943). In Minnesota ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940), the United States Supreme Court stated:
As we have often said, the legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it
may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be
clearest. If the law "presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied."
Id. at 275, citing, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) ; Semler v. Oregon
State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373
(1915); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
31. See State ex rel. Leon v. Baker, 238 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1970); Wills & Caruana,
Criminal Law and Procedure, Tenth Survey of Florida Law, 26 U. MiAmi L. REV. 289,
360 (1972).
32. It is clear that the right to counsel exists in those diversion programs wherein the
speedy trial waiver is requested subsequent to the filing of formal charges. Cf. Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In holding that no
right to counsel exists in a pre-indictment lineup, the case of Kerby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972) raises the possibility that no constitutionally protected right to counsel exists, how-
ever, where the waiver is executed prior to indictment or information.
33. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
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More controversial, however, is the practice of a number of diver-
sion programs of requiring a plea of guilt from the potential participant
as a prerequisite to acceptance, which is tantamount to waivers of the
rights against self-incrimination as well as to the right to trial by jury
and the right to confront witnesses. It is clear that such rights may be
waived voluntarily and intelligently, yet the coercion implicit in a denial
of diversion where the plea is not entered may well render the resulting
waiver of rights being designated involuntary and unconstitutional. 4
The Dade County program, along with the majority of intervention pro-
grams, does not require that the defendant either explicitly or implicitly
enter an admission of guilt.
Closely related to the practice of the Dade County Program of eli-
citing the consent of victims prior to accepting a defendant for diversion
is the practice of many intervention programs, including Dade County,
of requiring restitution for monetary damages suffered in the commission
of the acts allegedly committed by the defendant. In that the diverted
defendant has not been tried or found guilty of the offense, the practice
may be attacked as a coerced waiver of the right against self-incrimina-
tion and the rights to trial by jury and confrontation of witnesses, as in
the case of the requirement of a plea of guilty considered above. Addi-
tionally, in that many potential diversion participants are unable to make
financial restitution due to indigency, and are presumably denied parti-
cipation or unsuccessfully terminated, this practice may well violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.5
C. Issues Raised by Unsuccessful Termination: For What Reasons and
by Whom?
All existing diversion programs provide for the unsuccessful termi-
nation of participants for such reasons as renewed contact with law en-
forcement, failure to attend counseling sessions on a regular basis or fail-
ure to remain continually employed or in school attendance. It is obvi-
ous that these and other violations of program regulation call for sub-
jective decision on the part of program staff and that the reversion of the
former participant into the criminal process is an event which is of criti-
cal significance to the defendant and his case. In fact, however, no exist-
ing diversion programs afford administrative or judicial due process as
(1967). See also Brown v. State, 246 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971) and Harison v.
Wainwright, 243 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), dealing with right to counsel prior to the
filing of improper waiver of rights.
34. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). But see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), which suggests that a plea
of guilty entered as a means of avoiding unpleasant alternatives is not per se an involuntary
waiver of constitutional rights.
35. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), which prohibits, as unconstitutional, the
imprisonment of an indigent solely because he is too poor to pay traffic fines. Ci. Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
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prerequisite to program termination despite the fact that existing case
law would seem to require such safeguards.
Mempa v. Rhay"6 held that a probation revocation hearing consti-
tuted a critical stage in a criminal case warranting due process safe-
guards, and in Morrissey v. Brewer37 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli,88 a due
process hearing was required prior to the revocation of parole and pro-
bation respectively. The reasoning in the Gagnon case is particularly
cogent in that pretrial diversion is in many respects analagous to proba-
tion and in that termination or revocation may in either case result in
the defendant's loss of liberty:
[A]n exclusive focus on the benevolent attitudes of those who
administer the probation/parole system when it is working
successfully obscures the modification in attitude which is likely
to take place once the officer has decided to recommend revo-
cation. Even though the officer is not by this recommendation
converted into a prosecutor committed to convict, his role as
counsellor to the probationer or parolee is then surely compro-
mised. 9
Just as the revoking probation officer is held incapable of fairly de-
termining the issues involved in a probation revocation, so too would it
seem that the diversion program staff member is likewise ill-equipped
to objectively deal with the equities of termination from the intervention
program. The majority opinion in Gagnon adopted for probation revo-
cation hearings the "minimum requirements" mandated for parole revo-
cation in Morrissey v. Brewer4° and it would seem that the same require-
ments might well be constitutionally demanded of diversion programs.
The requirements are:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or]
parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evi-
dence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses...; (e) a
'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional pa-
role board, members of which need not be judicial officers or
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to
the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or]
parole.4
V. CONCLUSION: PRETRIAL INTERVENTION-PANACEA OR PLACEBO?
The nascent constitutional issues surrounding the diversion process
represent an inevitable, and healthy, consequence of the increasing insti-
36. 389 U.S. 128 (1967); accord, Gargan v. State, 217 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
37. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
38. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
39. Id. at 786.
40. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
41. 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
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tutionalization of intervention programs and the growing numbers of de-
fendants being enrolled. To date, the overall record of such programs,
based upon the data they have generated, has been impressive and the
mutual benefit derived from diversion programs by both prosecution
and defense will insure that legal challenges will be relatively infrequent
and will have the beneficial effect of reducing arbitrariness in program
administration while promoting some degree of uniformity in procedure
among the various programs. Whereas, to date, no such uniformity, and
much such arbitrariness, has resulted from the completely uncoordinated
geneses of the existing diversion programs in varied settings and with
differing priorities, this trend is a welcome one.
In that diversion programs will continue to demonstrate positive
cost-benefit data, and serve the interests of both prosecution and defense,
by diverting cases from the system, and in that small counseling case-
loads and the ability to control case intake will assure favorable rehabil-
itative trends among participants, it might appear likely to follow that
diversion offers a palliative of enormous significance to an ailing urban
criminal justice system.
The experience to date does indicate a need to continue and indeed
to expand, the intervention experiment. Yet recent steps in the direction
of permanence have revealed areas that should be of concern to the crim-
inal justice community and to students of diversion programs. During
1973, the American Bar Association's Commission on Correctional Fa-
cilities and Services established a National Pretrial Intervention Service
Center which was designed to serve as a clearinghouse for information
relative to diversion programs and, in September of the same year, the
first national conference of pretrial intervention programs was held in
Atlanta, Georgia. Both of these endeavors would seem to have exposed
two cardinal weaknesses in the diversion movement: first, the paucity of
relevant data and research generated to date and, secondly, the total ab-
sence of uniformity among programs and their failure to date to tran-
scend dependence upon personalities of the principal actors, project di-
rectors and prosecutors, and the peculiarities of the locality in which the
programs exist.
Indeed, the weaknesses are interrelated and the lack of uniformity
among the programs is the principal cause for the lack of data. Pro-
grams totally differ in crucial respects such as the following:
(1) Method of case selection: The programs are divided among
those in which the prosecutor controls the decision regarding which in-
dividuals, within eligible categories of charges, are selected and those
in which program staff makes that determination. Ideally all defendants
within an eligible offense category should be selected, but few programs
would appear to have the caseload capacity or the confidence of the
prosecutor necessary to achieve this ideal. In programs vesting selection
decision in the prosecutor, the weight of the evidence might become a
factor in deciding whether to prosecute or divert, rather than the charac-
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teristics or rehabilitative potential of the defendant. In any event, this
variable renders comparison of differing programs difficult.
(2) Types of charges excluded and types of defendants eligible: It
is likewise futile to compare recidivism data generated by programs re-
stricted to first offenders with those dealing with second or third offen-
ders, or to compare programs limited to restricted categories of offenses
with those accepting participants from broader offense definitions. In
that programs differ widely in these respects, what recidivism data has
been generated is of little value.
(3) Diversion method and length of diversion: Most programs vest
the decision to divert in the judiciary and the Dade County model,
wherein the prosecutor's discretion is relied upon, represents the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Obviously, programs will differ in cost-benefit
effectiveness in accordance with which method is selected. The more ec-
onomical program is that in which diversion occurs at the earliest in point
of time, thus minimizing the expenditure of criminal justice resources.
Also, the time length of the average diversion differs in existing programs
from three months to over a year, and the decision as to time period will
also have cost-benefit implications.
(4) Types of services rendered: Project Crossroads in Washing-
ton, D.C., and the earlier diversion programs modeled upon it, were
funded by the Labor Department and the emphasis in staff service ori-
entation was upon employment services and vocational training. Later
developing programs were funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, or other sources, with a re-emphasis upon non-manpower
services, such as personal counseling. Service priorities, counselor case-
load size, and frequency of counselor-participant contact represent addi-
tional variables to which no consensus exists among programs and which
further render comparisons difficult.
While factors such as the foregoing limit the relevance of data pro-
duced by intervention projects, and render nearly impossible even tenta-
tive conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the intervention effort as
a whole, the fact that priority decisions must be made with limited funds
has further impeded the evaluation effort. Few, if any, programs have
been prepared or willing to expend for research, funds which could other-
wise be allocated to staff and services.
Besides the inadequacy of research to date, an additional caveat to
an optimistic prognosis for the future expansion of diversion programs
is the fact that, to date, such programs have not yet demonstrated a de-
gree of permanence that transcends the personalities involved in insti-
tuting the program to begin with. In particular, the establishment of
such programs has been depedent upon the receptivity of the particular
prosecutor, a receptivity tempered by the reality that such an experi-
ment might well entail political risk. As has been noted above, an im-
portant attribute of the diversion program is its compatibility with the
objectives of both defense and prosecution, yet it is this compatibility
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that will disquiet the prosecutor who is attuned to the signals emanating
from police, victims and, generally, the more conservative elements in
the criminal justice community. And, it should at all times be remem-
bered that, irrespective of the agency nominally administering the diver-
sion program itself, it is the prosecutor who must bear the legal and po-
litical responsibility for the dismissal of charges in the successfully ter-
minated participant's case. It has been the unusual prosecutor who has
been willing not only to entertain the prospect of cooperation with a di-
version experiment, but who additionally has been willing to drop the
figurative other shoe and invoke his discretion not to prosecute diversion
program participants. The fact that only a small minority of large or
middle sized metropolitan areas have initiated diversion programs is an
indication that the receptive prosecutor has been the exception and that
he will continue to be the exception in the foreseeable future. Equally
important, even within jurisdictions served by the exceptional prosecu-
tors willing to experiment with diversion, it has yet to be demonstrated
that their successors in office will exhibit the same enthusiasm toward
the diversion program they inherit. In view of the all important vari-
ables of prosecutor receptivity and political risk, it is at this writing far
too early to look upon any existing diversion program as an institution
capable of self-perpetration.
Viewed in the perspective of the criminal justice system and its re-
sources, the preceding factors notwithstanding, the diversion experi-
ment appears to offer a valuable and relatively effective resource. Given
their capacity to control intake, intervention programs will continue to
demonstrate superiority to both incarceration and probation. Yet lest we
permit our enthusiasm over intervention to divert us from the pressing
need to reform and revitalize the criminal justice system in general, and
jail and probation in particular, it should be noted that the capacity of
the intervention alternative is limited. If resort to the intervention alter-
native displaces emphasis from the need for reform of the traditional
dispositional alternatives, the intervention experiment will rapidly fall
prey to the same problems and flaws as the existing system components.
Should the caseload of twenty increase to fifty, should acceptance cri-
teria be relaxed to accomodate heavy court calendars, in short, should
intervention be resorted to merely because little else has worked or is
working, then what should have remained a limited resource with a lim-
ited response will join existing institutions in a morass of ineffectiveness.
